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Foreword: Is Reliance Still Dead? 
RANDY E. BARNETI* 
This just in: Generalissinw Francisco Franco is still dead. 
Chevy Chase, Saturday Night Live, circa 1975 
One thing I found out when I was a prosecutor is that you should 
never tell a police officer he cannot do something, for that just serves as 
an open invitation for him to do it. In recent years, I have learned a 
similar lesson about legal scholarship which I should probably keep to 
myself but won't. If you proclaim the existence of a scholarly 
"consensus," this is an open invitation for academics to try to demolish 
such a claim. 
In 1996, I published an article entitled The Death of Reliance; based 
on a talk I gave at the annual meeting of the Association of American 
Law Schools on recent trends in legal scholarship. In it I claimed there 
then existed a "new consensus" that a "reliance theory" did not explain 
the doctrine of promissory estoppe1.1 What exactly a ''reliance theory" is 
has never been made clear by those who seemed to advocate it-apart 
from their insistence that, just as tort law rectified the harm caused by 
physical misconduct, the purpose of contract law was to rectify 
* Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of Law. J.D. 19TI, 
Harvard Law School; B.A. 1974, Northwestern University. <rbarnen@bu.edu>. I thank 
Michael Kelly for his helpful comments on a previous draft. 
1. Randy E. Barnett, The Death of ReliaJIce, 46 J. LEGAL Eouc. 518 (1996). 
2. That same year, I identified another "new consensus" in an article that has 
provoked a similar adverse reaction. See Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: 
The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY LJ. 1139 (1996). 
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detrimental reliance caused by verbal misconduct.3 
This claim entails that reliance must exist before there should be any 
recovery (thereby calling into question the propriety of enforcing 
executory agreements), and that the normal measure of damages should 
be the "reliance interest" (thereby calling into question the propriety of 
awarding the "expectation interest"). Moreover, if the heart of this cause 
of action was induced detrimental reliance, then whether or not the 
promisor intended to be legally bound by her promise, or manifested 
such an intent to the promisee, and whether or not the promisee 
reasonably believed the promise to be legally binding were wholly 
immaterial. All this was much debated by contracts scholars in the 
1960s and 1970s. 
The "death of reliance" of which I wrote was based on the fact that, by 
the 1980s and 1990s, most contracts scholars who had written in any 
depth on the subject had concluded on the basis of comprehensive case 
analyses that: (a) the existence of detrimental reliance was not sufficient 
to explain when a promissory estoppel action would succeed and (b) the 
existence of detrimental reliance was not necessary for an action based 
on promissory estoppel to succeed.4 
As to the ftrst claim it was shown that a claimant needed "reliance 
plus something" to prevail in a promissory estoppel action and, 
therefore, a "reliance theory" of promissory estoppel could not, standing 
alone, explain what this "something" might be. As to the second claim, 
some scholars found that courts were enforcing serious, but 
nonbargained-for, promises in a business context even in the absence of 
any provable detrimental reliance. In addition I noted that some 
scholars, though not yet a consensus, had begun questioning whether the 
"reliance interest" should ever be a proper measure of contract damages, 
even as a fallback recovery when the expectation interest cannot, for 
some reason, be computed with adequate certainty.s 
3. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 518-22 (describing "the rise and fall of reliance"). 
See also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 274-
77 (1986) (discussing reliance theories and their weaknesses). 
4. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 522-27 (describing "the new consensus"). There 
I discussed or cited the following works: Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyolld 
Reliallce: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, IS 
HOFSlRA L. REv. 443 (1987); Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyolld 
Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake, " 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 
903 (1985); Juliet P. Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging 
Under the Guise of Promissory Estoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. 
REv. 895 (1987); Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 
YALEL.J. 111 (1991). 
5. In my article, I cited Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest ill 
Contract Damages, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1755. Since I wrote, Kelly has been joined in 
this general opinion by David W. Barnes, The Net Expectation Interest ill Contract 
2 
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All this led me to conclude that, as a theory of promissory estoppel, 
reliance was dead. I did not claim, I hasten to add, that promissory 
estoppel was dead or dying.6 This was never even suggested by the 
scholarship I was reporting, nor have I ever contended that reliance was 
unimportant as a goal of contractual enforcement. To the contrary, I 
distinguished between ''the tort-like conception of contract in which the 
inducement of detrimental reliance mal be held to justify a remedy to 
compensate for the detriment incurred" from the quite different concern 
that "contracts are viewed as protecting one party's right to rely on the 
commitment of another."s That the protection and facilitation of reliance 
was an important function of contract law was never at issue in this 
debate. Rather, the "new consensus" scholars denied the claim made 
during the 1960s and 1970s that a reliance principle could explain the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel and even supplant altogether the 
traditional requirement of bargained-for consideration. 
The reaction to this thesis was pretty s\vift as scholarly reactions go, 
and far surpassed the reaction to the underlying scholarship I had been 
summarizing and reporting. (Lesson number 2: asserting the existence 
of a scholarly "consensus" is an excellent way to get yourself cited if it 
ticks off enough people.) Most notably challenged was claim (b): that 
the existence of reliance was no longer a necessary element of 
promissory estoppel. This was effectively refuted by a study of 
Damages, 48 EMORY L.J. 1137 (1999). Both authors are contributors to this Symposium. 
in which the challenges they have made to the ''reliance interest of contrnct damages" are 
both expanded and critically evaluated. 
6. Professor Charles Knapp has apparently misinterpreted my claim in precisely 
this way. See Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: Tile Perils of Promissory Estoppel. 
49 HAsTINGS Ll. 1191. 1244 (1998) (referring to "Professor Barnett's death notice for 
promissory estoppel"); id. at 1245 (referring to "earlier writers [who] have surveyed the 
case law and reported that promissory estoppel is dead" and citing to The Deatil of 
Reliance). Eric Mills Holmes, on whom Professor Knapp then relies to refute this 
alleged claim. understood that this was not the thesis of my earlier work with Mary 
Becker, supra note 4, on promissory estoppel. See Eric Mills Holmes, Tile Four Phases 
of Promissory Estoppel, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 45, 46 n.5 (1996). Holmes misinterprets 
our article in a different way, however. We were not "courteously allow[ing) the 
doctrine to rest in the shadowlands of tort and contrnct" Id. at 46. Rather, we tried to 
remove promissory estoppel from the shadow lands by categorizing a large part of the 
doctrine as lying squarely within contrnct law, and a smaller part lying squarely within 
tort. In contrast, in his important article (that appeared around the same time as The 
Death of Reliance), Holmes contends that "promissory estoppel is promissory estoppel." 
an equitable fonn of relief that sits on its own bottom. Id. at 48. 
7. Barnett, supra note 1, at 522. 
8. [d. 
3 
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promissory estoppel cases by Robert Hillman in which he found that the 
absence of reliance was dispositive in 25% of the cases in which 
promissory estoppel claims were denied.9 These data certainly support 
the conclusion that a reliance requirement for recovery in promissory 
estoppel does indeed exist and, in this regard at least, reliance is not 
dead. 
But Hillman's study also suggested that the existence of a promise 
was as necessary as detrimental reliance to a promissory estoppel action. 
In 135 cases (50%) a defect in the promise was discussed while in 52 of 
these cases (19% of the total cases surveyed) reliance was not 
discussed.1O As Hillman notes: ''The result here should not be surprising 
if both promise and reliance are prerequisites for recovery on promissory 
estoppel grounds.,,11 In one sense, this seems unremarkable. Section 90 
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts always said that a promise was 
needed for promissory estoppel. Indeed, section 90 does not use the 
term "promissory estoppel" at all, speaking instead of "Promise 
Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance.,,12 For that matter, though 
it explicitly refers to "a promise," the Restatement does not actually use 
the term "reliance"-instead referring to promises that "induce action or 
forbearance on the part of the promisee.,,1 
But though it should have come as no surprise that the existence of a 
promise was still a requirement of promissory estoppel, this finding still 
undercut the old 1960s and 1970s "reliance theory" of promissory 
estoppel in which reliance on any verbal conduct was to be treated like a 
form of a verbal tort. According to this approach, Hoffman v. Red Owl 
Stores, Inc. 14 was the harbinger of bigger things to come. The court in 
Red Owl had dispensed with the requirement that it actually enforce a 
promise of a franchise made by the defendant. In the much heralded 
words of the Red Owl court in response to the objection that 
the "promise" was not definite enough to merit ordinary 
contractual enforcement: "We deem it would be a mistake to regard an 
action grounded on promissory estoppel as the equivalent of a breach-of-
contract action."IS 
This was taken to signal that promissory estoppel was not the 
"substitute for consideration" that Samuel Williston explicitly, and the 
9. Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory 
Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 580, 600 (1998). 
10. [d. at 599 n.87. 
11. Id. at 601. 
12. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). 
13. [d. 
14. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965). 
15. [d. at 275. 
4 
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Restatements implicitly, conceived it to be:6 That is, it was not merely a 
substitute for a nonexistent bargain in fmding enforceability of a 
promise that otherwise met all the normal requirements of a contract. 
Rather, it was a different beast altogether and one that, if properly fed 
and nurtured, could grow to supplant the bargain theory of consideration 
entirely. In place of a requirement of reciprocal inducement, by which 
we establish enforceability and all the other formal requirements by 
which we assess the existence of assent, would be an omnibus cause of 
action based upon injuries caused by reliance on the verbal conduct of 
others, in the same way that tort law compensates for injuries caused by 
the physical conduct of others. Contracts would not themselves die 
away, but contract law with its basic principle that contractual duties 
were the creation of consenting parties would be supplanted by tort law 
that imposes duties on people whether or not they consent. 
Extolling very rare judicial statements in such cases as Red Owl, 
progressive contracts scholars lobbied for what Grant Gilmore colorfully 
called the "Death of Contract.,,·7 And it was this campaign of the 1960s 
and 1970s that provoked the "new consensus" scholarship debunking the 
role of reliance. Significantly, as was just seen in the data presented by 
Professor Hillman, the recent reaction to this "new consensus" 
scholarship has not undermined the importance of promise:! To the 
contrary, it has reinforced it. Nor has it undermined the claim that the 
existence of detrimental reliance alone is not sufficient to support an 
action of promissory estoppel. For one thing, a promise is also required, 
but more than that may also be necessary. 
In an important article published almost simultaneously with 
Hillman's, Sidney DeLong presented the results of his survey of a 
similarly massive number of promissory estoppel cases over 
substantially the same time period.19 His study confirmed Hillman's 
finding that detrimental reliance remained a necessary element of an 
action for promissory estoppel,20 and to that extent at least the "new 
16. See s. WUllSTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 139, llt 307 (l920) (section 
entitled ''Estoppel As a Substitute for Consideration"). 
17. Grant Gilmore, THEDEATIiOFCONTRACT(l974). 
18. See Hiilman, supra note 9. 
19. Sidney W. DeLong, The Ne.... Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in 
Commercial Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catdl-22, 1997 WIS. L REv. 943. 
20. See Uf. at 981 ("A legion of unhappy plaintiffs can bear witness 10 the 
continued vitality of the actual reliance requirement, having discovered thllt a 
commercial promise is not alone sufficient to ground n claim under Section 90."). 
5 
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consensus" scholars were wrong as a descriptive matter. But, unlike 
Hillman, DeLong also tried to discern the factor or factors that might be 
needed to tum detrimental reliance in the absence of a bargain into a 
successful cause of action. 
According to DeLong, his data suggest the existence of two types of 
reliance which he called "performance reliance" and "enforcement 
reliance.,,21 Performance reliance refers to the trust that a promisee puts 
in the promisor to perform his promise. For many reasons, wholly apart 
from the perception of enforceability, the promisee believes that the 
promise will be performed. Enforcement reliance, by contrast, refers to 
reliance on a promise that a promisee reasonably believes to be made 
with the intention of being legally binding. DeLong suggests a norm 
may be developing that limits promissory estoppel recoveries to 
enforcement reliance.22 If this is so, it means that to succeed in making a 
promissory estoppel claim you need "detrimental reliance plus 
something"-and that "something" is a manifested intention to be 
legally bound.23 
All this, of course, is purely descriptive (and it is far from clear from 
his tone that DeLong approves of the judicial trend he reports). It does 
not answer the normative question of whether promissory estoppel 
actions should be limited to cases where detrimental reliance can be 
proved or should extend to any manifestation of intention to be legally 
bound whether bargained-for or not, and whether relied upon or not. I 
have suggested elsewhere that this would be a good thing: that 
contractual enforcement is justified, prima facie, whenever there has 
been a consent to be legally bound, whether explicit or implicit.24 
Id. 
21. See id. at 953. 
22. See id. at 1003. 
Many of the opinions reported in 1995 and 1996 lend support to the thesis that, 
in order to prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, a commercial promisee 
must now demonstrate not only that her reliance was reasonable in light of the 
likelihood that the promisor would perform, but also that she had a reasonable 
belief that the promise was legally enforceable when made. 
23. See id. at 994 ("[T]he 1995-96 case sample contains several decisions 
suggesting that a manifestation of consent to be legally bound may be becoming 
essential to liability under Section 90."). 
24. Barnett, supra note 3, at 319; Randy E. Barnett, ... And Contractual Consent, 
3 S. CAL. lNTERDISC. L.J. 421 (1993); Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract 
as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1022 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, The Function of 
Several Property and Freedom of Contract, 9 Soc. PHIL. & POL'y 62 (1992); Randy 
Barnett, The Internal and External Analysis of Concepts, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 525 
(1990). The implications of this claim for contract law doctrine are developed in: Randy 
E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'y 179 (1986); 
Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract: Default Rules, 
Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 
783 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract Theory, 
6 
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In sum, the existence of a manifested intention to be legally bound is 
what might, as a descriptive matter, and ought to, as a normative matter, 
separate the detrimental reliance that justifies legal relief from the 
detrimental reliance that does not. And no theorist has ever advocated 
compensating all and every form of detrimental reliance on the words 
and deeds of another. Instead, they have advocated basing recovery on 
reasonable, justified, or foreseeable reliance. But the next question 
immediately to be answered has always been: What exactly (or even 
approximately) constitutes the circumstances that make reliance 
reasonable, justified, or foreseeable so as to render the promise 
enforceable? It cannot be the presence of reliance since reliance is 
present in all such cases. In other words, a purely "reliance theory" 
cannot explain when detrimental reliance gives rise to a recovery and 
when it does not. Reliance theorists have been either silent or vague in 
their answers to this question. 
In the interest of putting some doctrinal meat on these theoretical 
bones, both in my Death of Reliance article and in the first edition of my 
casebook, I formulated a series of hypothetical Restatement sections that 
might provide more guidance to courts than the current sections 71 and 
90.25 The first of these, section 71A, accepted as the starting point the 
proposal of Farber and Matheson that: "A promise is enforceable when 
made in furtherance of an economic activity."Uj Any promise made 
between commercial parties would be presumed enforceable unless there 
was some expressed or implied-in-fact disclaimer of liability. The 
second, section 71B, established the reverse default rule in cases of 
noncommercial promises. Such promises would be unenforceable 
unless supported by a formality manifesting an intention to be legally 
bound. In section ?lC, I described circumstances in which the existence 
of substantial reliance would itself indicate to the promisee that a 
promisor intended her promise to be legally binding. And finally. in 
section ?lD, I proposed that a promise meeting the requirements of 
sections 71A-C might still be unenforceable if the promisor could show 
that a reasonable promisee would not have understood the promisor to 
have intended the promise to be legally binding. 
Upon further reflection, I have been persuaded that this scheme runs 
75 CAL. L. REv. 1969 (1987). 
25. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 529-36; RANDy E. BARNE1T, CO!'>'TRACfS: CAsES 
AND DOC1RINE 906-15 (1st ed. 1995). 
26. Barnett, supra note 1, at 539. 
7 
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the risk of overenforcement.27 The problem is its starting point: replacing 
the requirement of bargained-for consideration with the rebuttable 
presumption that any commercial promise should be enforced. I now 
think, and Sidney DeLong's study confirms that courts may think 
likewise, that too many promises not intended to be legally binding or 
reasonably taken as such by promisees would be enforced if this default 
rule were adopted. What is needed is not the overthrow of the bargain 
requirement but, like section 90 itself, a supplement to compensate for 
the underinclusiveness of section 71-though one that is more definite 
and theoretically clear than the extraordinarily open-ended section 90. 
In the second edition of my casebook,28 I replaced the fourfold 
alternative to both sections 71 and 90 with the following substitute only 
for section 90: 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONTRACfS 
§90. ENFORCEABILITY OF NONBARGAIN PROMISES 
In the absence of consideration as defined in §71, a promise is binding if 
(1) the promise is accompanied by a formality that manifests an intention to 
be legally bound, such as: 
(a) a seal or 
(b) the recital of a nominal consideration or 
(c) an expression of intention to be legally bound, or 
(d) copies of a writing sent to both the promisor and the promisee and 
bearing the signatures of both parties; or 
(2) with the knowledge of the promisor, the promise induces reliance by the 
promisee 
(a) that is so substantial that it would be unlikely in the absence of a 
manifested intention by the promisor to be legally bound ... and, 
(b) the promisee expects the promise to be enforceable and is aware that 
the promisor has knowledge of the promisee's reliance, and 29 
(c) the promisor remains silent concerning the promisee's reliance. 
The idea here is twofold. Allow enforcement based on bargained-for 
commitments (which typically manifest an intention to be legally bound) 
to be supplemented by those nonbargained-for commitments that, 
whether by formalities or substantial reliance, also manifest an intention 
to be legally bound. I do not contend that this will capture the whole of 
what promissory estoppel doctrine currently enforces. But it does 
capture the aspect of promissory estoppel that sounds in contract. Most 
notably, it excludes the proportionately small number of cases now 
27. See Christopher Wonnell, Expectation, Reliance, and The Two Contractl/a/ 
Wrongs, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 53, 122-23 (2001). 
28. RANDY E. BARNETf, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE (2d ed. 1999). 
29. /d. at 872. 
8 
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handled by promissory estoppel that properly sound in lorl. Mary 
Becker and I proposed an expansion of the tort of promissory 
misrepresentation to include not only lies-when-made, but also 
statements that recklessly or negligently misrepresent the reliability of 
the promise.30 This was the theory that we contended best explained the 
recovery in Red Owfi just as we contended that Goodman v. Dickern 
was also a negligent misrepresentation case, not a case of breach of 
contract. 
Of course all this presupposes that it matters whether promissory 
estoppel sounds in contract or in tort. The virtue of making such a 
categorical distinction has long been questioned by legal realists. 
Recently, Charles Knapp has responded to The Dealh of Reliance and 
the "new consensus" articles on which it was based in a lengthy and 
complicated article running nearly 150 journal pages.') In a section 
entitled "Felix Unger Cleans House: Reliance Refurbished,' .. " he takes 
issue with my original fourfold doctrinal proposal. He also questions the 
merits of my effort with Mary Becker to distinguish the contractual from 
the tortious aspects of promissory estoppel doctrine, and my insistence 
that consent to be legally bound is what characterizes the contract side of 
the doctrinal divide. ''Why this contract/tort line is such a sore spot with 
commentators like Barnett," writes Knapp, "has never been clear to 
me.,,3S 
Knapp concludes by disparaging the "first-year-of-Iaw-school 
mentality [that] insists on compartmentalizing fraud with torts, even 
though anecdotal empirical evidence suggests that many torts teachers 
spend little or no time on it.,,36 Moreover, he says: 
The insistence on doctrinal purity by Barnett and others smacks of nothing so 
30. Barnett & Becker, supra note 4, at 485-95. 
31. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965). 
32. 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948). 
33. Knapp, supra note 6. Professor Knapp's extensive discussion of the role of 
reliance in contract merits a far more careful and lengthy analysis than I can give it here. 
34. Id. at 1233-44. 
35. Id. at 1243. 
36. Id. at 1244. That first-year tort teachers spend little or no time on fraud is an 
argument for contracts professors to cover fraud at least briefly to contrast it with the 
defense of misrepresentation, as I do in my casebook. BARNEtT. sllpra note 28. at 1071-
79. It is not an argument for eliminating the doctrinal distinction between fraud and 
misrepresentation or between tort and contract Similarly. my casebook includes a 
section on agency since it is so rarely covered by teachers of corporations. See id. at 
572-96. This does not argue for collapsing the distinction between contract and agency. 
9 
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much as the compulsive tidiness of a bunch of academic Felix Ungers, so intent 
on neat ordering that they ignore the uses to which the lawyering Oscar 
Madisons of the real world may put these doctrines. People make promises, 
people break promises, other people get hurt. Is this tort? Is this contract? As 
Karl Llewellyn once pungently remarked, "What the helI!"37 
Professor Knapp does not really object to tidiness in drafting legal 
texts. For example, he suggests modest improvements to the precise 
language of my proposed Restatement sections. "At the very least (I 
know this sounds like nit-picking here-indulge me)," he writes, "a 
better-drafted subsection [71(a)] would have begun, like so many other 
sections of the Restatement and the u.e.e., with the cautionary phrase, 
'Except as provided in this section .... ",38 This concern for drafting 
tidiness is only natural, as Professor Knapp is a contracts lawyer, 
teacher, scholar, and the author of a wonderful contracts casebook. So 
my suggestion to improve the scope of section 90 cannot really be 
dismissed because it is tidy. Rather, Knapp must be concerned that it is 
tidy in an inappropriate way. His expressed concern-that 1 ignore the 
way lawyers in the world might use these doctrines-is inapt. The entire 
reason to tidy up the doctrine is to prevent lawyers (and judges) in the 
real world from abusing imprecise, ambiguous, or misguided language. 
The focus, then, is on whether we should preserve a realm of law for 
obligations voluntarily undertaken, because their very voluntariness 
creates a range of opportunities and benefits that cannot be obtained in 
the absence of consensual transactions. 
One wonders: if the distinction between tort and contract were really 
so unimportant, why have academics been trying for decades to tear 
down the doctrinal wall between them? The answer is apparent. 
Contractual obligation has traditionally been thought to originate in the 
consent of the parties, and traditional contract doctrine reflects this. Tort 
obligations are imposed upon the parties by the law regardless of their 
consent. Hostility to the contract/tort distinction stems from a desire to 
abolish consent as the fount of contract and impose all obligations on 
parties. This hostility to consent was nowhere more clearly manifested 
than in the case of In Re Baby "M,,39 when the New Jersey Supreme 
Court held a surrogacy contract to be against public policy. Responding 
to the contention that the surrogate mother "agreed to the surrogacy 
agreement," the court wrote: "[W]e suggest that her consent is 
37. Knapp, supra note 6, at 1244 (citing KARL LLEWELLYN, PUT IN HIS THUMB 39-
40 (1931». I take no umbrage at the "Felix Unger" epithet. Professor Knapp tried to be 
witty in all his section headings. And the first time I read the article, for a brief moment 
I thought this section was going to be about Roberto Unger, not me. 
38. [d. at 1239-40. 
39. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
10 
HeinOnline -- 38 San Diego L. Rev. 11 2001
[VOL. 38: 1,2001] Foreword 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
irrelevant.',40 Not lacking, not vitiated, not overridden by conflicting 
considerations, but irrelevant. 
Rendering consent irrelevant to contract is the reason to tear down the 
wall between contract and tort. It is a concern for freedom of contract 
that motivates many of those who care about the contract/tort distinction, 
not some "doctrinal purity" or "compulsive tidiness." And I suggest that 
the reverse is true as well. Those who are indifferent to the distinction 
between contract and tort are, at best, indifferent to the freedom of 
contract that this distinction tries to preserve. Neither of these 
arguments is random, but I have from the beginning made my normative 
basis explicit-leading Professor Knapp to refer to my "libertarian 
principles.''''! 
The problem for Knapp and other adherents to a general "reliance 
theory" of contract, which I say again has never been systematically 
articulated, is that the normal rules of contract law-both of contract 
formation and of defenses to enforcement-are themselves pretty 
"libertarian" or "c1assicalliberal." Thus, these rules need to be blurred 
and eroded if one is to accomplish "progressive" ends that violate 
libertarian or c1assicalliberal means. 
If DeLong is right, then despite its open-ended formulation, section 90 
has done little damage to the principle of freedom of contract and, by 
counteracting the underenforcement of the bargain theory of 
consideration, has actually done some good. Nevertheless, I believe we 
can and should do better. It is dangerous to individual parties to leave 
the loaded gun of section 90 lying casually around for some judicial 
Oscar Madison to pick up and misuse. Whether it is my formulation or 
another, we should provide more guidance to courts about the true nature 
of promissory estoppel. And this is to protect the same freedom that 
contract law generally protects: the ability of parties to consent to 
binding obligations giving rise to a right of others to rely on those 
obligations.42 If that is "ideological" then so is the drive to deny contract 
law of this vital function. 
In the symposium that follows, some of the most thoughtful contracts 
scholars writing today present their takes on the third challenge to a 
40. Id. at 1249. 
41. Knapp, supra note 6. at 1241. 
42. For a general defense of freedom of contact see RAND'!' E. BARNEtT. THE 
S1RUCfURE OF LmERTY: JUSTICE AND TIlE RULE OF LAw 53-57. 65-67. 101-02. 140-41. 
154-55 (1998). 
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"reliance theory" of contract that I did not claim to be the subject of a 
consensus back in 1996: the import and coherence of the "reliance 
interest in contract damages." Several of the participants-David 
Barnes, Sydney DeLong, and Michael Kelly, for example-have already 
participated in this ongoing scholarly debate on the proper role of 
reliance. Some are skeptical of the role of reliance; others are more 
supportive. Whether this new skepticism of the reliance interest in 
contract damages represents a "new consensus," I will not say. For the 
time being, at least, I am out of the consensus-identifying business. 
If this Symposium is any indication, reliance is still very much alive as 
a concern of contract theorists. It was ever thus. Nevertheless, most of 
what follows concerning the proper measure of damages for breaching 
an enforceable commitment is consistent with my basic thesis. While 
reliance remains a fundamental principle or end of contract law, as it 
always has been, it is consent to be legally bound that provides the 
essential means to the end of protecting the right to rely on the 
commitments of others and to other vital ends as well. 
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